II. Some Historical Aspects of Aesthetics

2.1 The development of ideas in art criticism, art history, and aesthetics is difficult to trace, and certainly the writing of a history of the theoretical evolution of these fields must await the hand of those more competent to assess the total field. Nonetheless, I have brashly decided that some treatment of the relation of the theoretical position taken here, i.e. in the present work, to previous theory is necessary.

Of course, only a few such theories can be dealt with in the present work. There is, however, no dearth of discussion of the history of art studies in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Most of the works discussed here deal with this at some length, emphasizing in each case the particular viewpoint taken. The summaries in Hauser (1959) and Munro (1963) are particularly useful.

The treatment of art is an area where anthropology should not and cannot operate in isolation or ignorance of all that has gone before. It is probably not unfair to state that many, if not most, anthropologists are skeptical about art criticism, history, and the "science" of aesthetics. No small cause of this has been the almost frenzied desire of anthropology to be a "science", and this has often meant the aping of certain positivist, materialistic attitudes which denigrate researches dealing with intellectual or what have been called "spiritual" matters. As A. L. Kroeber once remarked:

On reflection, it is really remarkable that the whole of organized modern science should still shrink from attempting to occupy a large, important, and interesting area of nature - that of style - because it has been the habit of those more preoccupied with style to talk about it in terms charged with quality ratings and feeling tones. The avoidance suggests that scientists are still pretty unsure of themselves and their method beyond the long-tilled fields and well-trodden paths. (1947:487)
In retrospect, it may be that some of this "unsureness" was justified insofar as the anthropological techniques employed were still oriented toward the methods of natural or even physical sciences. With the growth of increasing sophistication in the analysis of cultural systems, anthropology seems finally to be ready to operate with style. In doing so, it is becoming clear that many of the new approaches taken up in anthropology are closely similar to some but, by no means all, of those of aesthetics, criticism, and art history. The problems which have been faced in anthropology and art studies are often the same. As evidenced by George Kubler and Thomas Munro, art historians and theoreticians are becoming increasingly aware of this conjunction. The reverse, unfortunately, seems less true. Nonetheless, the importance of the contribution which art studies can make to anthropology is great.

2.2 The subject of "style" has been one aspect of human behavior where cultural configurations have long been recognized. Vitruvius' *De Architectura*, written during the reign of Caesar Augustus, is not only of interest in its own right as a statement of early imperial styles, but even as much so in that it preserves valuable remnants of early Greek sources on architecture. Thus Vitruvius and his forebears as mentioned above are witness to the growth of the sort of cultural self-consciousness which today is expressed in the presence of the social sciences.

In the early philosophical treatments of the arts, we find what appears to be the heavy influence of Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of the "ideal". That is, until recently (and not only in Classic times as we shall see!) treatments of style have often been normative
and directive. They prescribe certain approaches and techniques as correct, or most highly developed, and proscribe others. Thus, there are neo-classical approaches which condemn all other styles. Likewise, in certain 19th century criticism there is the idea that the aim is imitation of nature and that all styles which do not achieve this are primitive, clumsy, or degenerate. In a word, we are dealing with ethnocentrism as it appears in the arts.

2.3 Theories of "art" are legion, and it is neither necessary nor desirable that even all of the major theories be covered here. Those who talk about style "in terms charged with quality ratings" are, in fact, the typical art theoreticians in the minds of many. This type of art criticism exists and is rather like a "normative" grammar in its object to restrict artistic activity or analysis to certain "correct" paths.

Bernard Berenson in his Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts (1948) is an example of a value-linked "normative" statement about the functions and place of art criticism. In some ways, it seems almost incredible that Berenson's treatment of art was written in the mid-20th century and not a hundred years earlier. Yet, as anyone who has had contact with any less-"enlightened" art historians and critics can testify, the sort of ethnocentric partisanship which mars Berenson's whole argument is by no means dead. It is scarcely necessary to document Berenson's failure to understand forms of art lying outside of his own interests. There are repeated references throughout the book which equate non-classical, non-European with "primitive infantile". For example, we have Berenson's statement that "Fuzzy-wuzzy" art can
"at best initiate us into the civilization of a savage kraal" (1948:78).

Like Croce, discussed below, Berenson does not feel that there is any real relationship between "milieu" and art, and "art history without names" (1948:192-3). He also, as Croce did, distinguishes in this work between an "aesthetic personality" and a biographical one (1948:192-3). Although this point is not discussed at length here, this raises important questions about the relation of style to culture.

Berenson does see style as a constant and unassailable way of seeing things (213) and also recognizes that "seeing" is learned. But he never fully explores the consequences of these beliefs nor applies them to his own critical position. In pleading for what seems to be a return to the "old values", Berenson and others like him have pursued a theoretical dead end. As Berenson appears to admit in his "Conclusion", his yearning for a return to the classical is a prejudice. He and others apply what they believe to be the system of judgment of this art to all art. Thus, there is no attempt to really discover the methods and concepts of space representation utilized in Egyptian painting, for example, and it is merely dismissed as "primitive infantile". For these reasons, Berenson and others who share his outlook have little to contribute to a general theory of art, art history, or culture, despite their obvious scholarship and learning in their fields of competence.

Berenson does cautiously limit the position which he takes against non-European art by maintaining that only European art is "life-enhancing" for Europeans. This can be seen in his statement quoted above about "Fuzzy-wuzzy" art. It scarcely needs to be noted that this type of ethnocentrism is entirely inconsistent with an
anthropological viewpoint. Berenson's outline of art history, in fact, has about the same relationship to real events and relationships as does a political campaign biography.

Berenson's main orientation, then, is based in intuition and value. Certainly no one can deny that intuition is a powerful tool, if somewhat erratic. Researchers of all kinds depend heavily upon it. Berenson in his heavy reliance upon feeling (e.g. 1948:209-10) has taken here as an example of a particular type of criticism which shares many of the concepts which are treated herein, but which fails to apply these concepts equally to all art. Great as the contributions made by such critics may be in their own area of competence, they suffer from a kind of "displaced" ethnocentricism - "displaced" because often the art which they worship is that of the past and not that of their own culture. Too often, the standards of judgment applied to such art bear little relation to the standards under which it was created.

2.4 Benedetto Croce is an important figure in the development of the theory of art. In many respects he has foreshadowed the theories developed here, but his work is surprisingly difficult to assess. Aesthetic was written at the turn of the (20th) century, yet it is often difficult to discover his exact meaning today, so much have some concepts altered in this sixty-year span.

In some ways, Croce is as "absolute" about matters of taste as is Berenson, yet he clearly attacks any position that aesthetic value can be placed outside the aesthetic activity (1922:122). Thus, he rejects a Platonic ideal. Yet, he also disputes the validity of relativism and affirms an absolutism of his own sort:
The criterion of taste is absolute, with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination. Thus any act of expressive activity, which is so really, is to be recognized as beautiful, and any fact as ugly in which expressive activity and passivity are found engaged with one another in an unfinished struggle. (1922:122-3)

This aspect of Croce's work is perhaps not very fruitful for our purposes.

But for Croce, judgment depends upon reproduction of the object in oneself, that is, reproduction of the expression which has been fixed in a definite physical material (e.g. 118, 125). Croce recognized the "reproduction" depended on replacing the conditions in which the stimulus was produced. As an example of this kind of replacement of conditions, Croce hails the successes achieved in restoration of texts by philologists and works of art by restorers. In short Croce's reproduction of expression, though it refers only to single works of art, is very like our generative statement for a style as a whole. To this degree, by demanding that each work be taken of itself with its own conditions, Croce also recognizes a sort of relativity of judgment, although, like so many others, he denies relativity altogether because he feels that proper critical judgments can be made. A modern relativism does not claim, however, that judgments are not possible, but rather that it is difficult or impossible to judge one system by the rule of another. For Croce, historical criticism and interpretation are the tools which allow his sort of relative absolutism and which "link up again broken traditions"(1922:126).

That Croce's concept of "reproduction" is in some ways rather like the concept of "generative statements" is nowhere clearer,
perhaps, than in his discussion of the relationship of linguistic and aesthetic:

Those linguists or philologists, philosophically endowed, who have penetrated deepest into the problems of language, find themselves (to employ a trite but effective simile) like workmen piercing a tunnel: at a certain point they must hear the voices of their companions, the philosophers of Aesthetic, who have been at work on the other side. At a certain stage of scientific elaboration, Linguistic, in so far as it is philosophy, must merge itself in Aesthetic; and this indeed it does without leaving a residue. (1922:151-2)

It is clear that Croce was aware of the homology of cultural manifestations.

The possibility of writing grammars for such cultural systems has been discussed, yet Croce attacks, at other points, the idea of "grammar". What Croce means by "grammar", however, is "normative" grammar as he makes quite clear. In fact, Croce's philosophical leaning is very close to that of modern linguistics as is apparent in his discussion of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1922:324 ff). Von Humboldt's work forms much of the basis for Croce's treatment of art as activity and expression rather than as "works". Exactly the same part of von Humboldt's work forms an historical background for modern generative linguistics as well (cf. Chomsky, 1964:17).

Croce has received rather rough treatment from some modern commentators. At least part of this appears to be the result of having read Croce for purposes other than those for which he wrote. For example, Munro - admittedly interested in something else altogether - characterizes Croce as considering each work unique; Croce's is therefore "anti-scientific"(Munro 1963:27). But Croce's concern here,
the unity and indivisibility of the work of art, is certainly not his most important historic contribution.

Munro also criticizes Croce for his attack on the naturalistic aesthetics of Spencer (Munro 1963:72). Croce does attack Spencer; but, as we have seen, natural science approaches and science are not synonymous. In rejecting Spencer and naturalism, Croce has not necessarily rejected scientific method. Munro is right, however, in pointing out that Croce does reject analysis of art into its components (Munro 1963:227). Much of this is undoubtedly Croce's overreaction to particularistic and typological treatments in linguistics (e.g. Croce 1922:146-7).

So it is that Croce sees the important, indeed sole, linguistic unit as the sentence (1922:146). As in his indivisible art work, such an attitude is important as an indication of the sort of problems Croce was reacting to. Thus, "expression is an indivisible whole"(1922:146). But Croce is not against all attempts at linguistic classification, for he praises that "queen of classifications", the historico-genealogical, because of the factor of continuity through time. Croce asks, "What are laws of words which are not at the same time laws of style?"(1922:150). Croce does not appear to be so much against all analysis as he is against analysis according to typological principles. In any case, even with his objections to analysis as done at that time, modern analytical techniques can go far toward meeting his legitimate criticisms.

Croce opposed naturalistic analogy in art. He saw the unity of art and language but in terms of expression and activity
rather than communication. Finally, Croce foreshadowed in subtle ways the idea of generative statements of art. To paraphrase Croce's own tribute to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Croce often opposes Croce: amongst the old dross we detect the brilliant gleams of a wholly new concept of art (1922:327).

2.5 In so far as an outsider can judge, Croce's work does not represent the main stream of much of art theory, however. Perhaps the most influential work done on style is Wölfflin's Principles of Art History, first published in 1915. This is a treatment of "modes of perception" (1932:13) as a factor of styles in time. Five polar concepts - 1. linear and painterly, 2. plane and recession, 3. open and closed form, 4. multiplicity and unity, and 5. absolute and relative clarity - are given (1932:14-15) which are used to describe the transition from classic to baroque. As can be seen, this is not so much different from Croce in approach as it is a solution of a different problem.

Wölfflin is concerned with the "replacement of conditions", but these five concepts appear to be so much broader than the kind of "reproduction" that Croce discussed that they are not on the same level of concern. The polar concepts are essentially hypotheses about the developments in the manner of beholding reality in Occidental art. They are certainly a different way of "beholding" than the theory developed in the present work. These polar concepts apply to all media though development may not be exactly parallel. They describe a kind of "total" style. Although they deal with the underlying characteristics of classical and baroque art, no one could recreate these artistic traditions from these terms alone. The essentially typological character
of this approach has been pointed out by Hauser (1959:145).

For an anthropologist the use of these polar concepts would be a little like trying to discuss a language in terms like guttural-musical; or, perhaps more exactly analogous, analytical-inflectional. Depending on one's viewpoint, this kind of distinction may or may not be useful. It does not suffice as a total analysis of a language or a style, however. For this reason, the whole question of the universality and value of these concepts is of little concern here despite their influence. Arnold Hauser (1959) treats this matter at length, and there is little reason to repeat his arguments again.

A related aspect of Wölfflin's thought is the concept of art "history without names". The term is originally Comte's and is much the same concept as the "superorganic" in anthropology. Certainly, on the grand scale on which Wölfflin is working, the individual cannot, in fact, play any readily apparent role. As Lévi-Strauss has commented with regard to a different but similar discussion on the goals of ethnography,"such studies deceive us because they do not teach us anything about the conscious and unconscious processes in concrete individual or collective experience, . . . . "(1963:6).

In one sense, the theory of style purposed here reconciles the art as activity of Croce with the concept of stylistic unity of Wölfflin. In doing so, this avoids "super-individual creative principle" mysticism and substitutes the concept of the social unit as artist and critic. Wölfflin's theory is not without its influence in some areas of anthropology as may be seen in Lévi-Strauss' treatment of oppositions (see for example, Lévi-Strauss, 1963:86). These have a haunting resemblance to Wölfflin's ways of beholding.
There is another side to Wölfflin's theory of style. The transitions from one of the ways of beholding to another within a particular pair of polar concepts are considered to be irreversible, though perhaps, not inevitable. Wölfflin thus sees a periodicity, but he is much too well acquainted with his subject to attribute a constant rate of change to this sequence, although he does observe continual change (1932: 231). He also recognizes the fact that "the parallel between the individual arts is not complete" (1932:232). In both his description of the internal developments of styles and of the "renewal of style" (e.g. 1932:233), Wölfflin is discussing "evolutionary" developments.

2.6 This leads directly into the multiplicity of evolutionary and, often, organismic treatment of art history. Many of the evolutionary theories of art are closely linked with important historical advances achieved by careful consideration of historical environment. Those, however, which have concerned themselves with grand historical cycles are far removed from the questions of immediate interest here. This is not to say that these questions are uninteresting in general or unimportant. Questions of cyclicity and evolutionary stages are simply beyond the scope of the level of theory under discussion.

Like similar schemes in anthropology, many of these evolutionary theories in the arts have had their major value as heuristic rather than processual explanations. Thomas Munro has dealt with these theories and others in his monumental Evolution in the Arts (1963) which represents a valuable new synthesis of evolutionary studies. The chapter in this work on "The Descent of Styles and Traditions"
(Chapter XVI) is of particular interest. In this, Munro defines "style" in essentially typological terms. As I have already hinted above, I feel that this definition of style is theoretically inadequate. While no one would deny that style is "a kind of type . . . involving a set of interrelated, recurrent traits" (1963:288), this actually deals with only the surface indications of style and tends to obscure the much more interesting, to me at least, questions of style as a system. By this I mean that entirely distinct kinds of phenomena such as "blue" and "balanced", though arrived at through analysis not much different than that proposed here, are simply treated as traits in a list. I believe that at least part of the difference here results from fundamental differences over the purpose of stylistic analysis. Munro, and, it seems to me, many other art historians, have been concerned with the setting of one style apart from others - in other words with the recognition features of a style. It is rather as though linguists would be satisfied with simply being able to distinguish French from German. On the contrary, I am interested in what a style is and in analysis of particular styles. Of course, many studies in art history share this aim in practical application (for example, Matz and Kaschnitz). Furthermore, detailed analysis beyond the level required for recognition will inevitably lead to greater insight into comparison and history, even as it has in historical linguistics.

Munro also distinguishes a great variety of different kinds of styles. These include period or historic styles, non-period or multi-period styles, polytechnical styles, and revived period styles. All in all, this part of Munro's theoretical discussion of style is a rather strong argument for flexibility in the use of the term. "Style", as I have defined it, is closest to "historical style". Yet there is nothing, insofar as I can
see, in Munro's treatment of art history, aside from this question of
definition of style, which is inconsistent with the rest of the theory
discussed here. On the contrary, his treatment is complementary,
and is closely allied to anthropological theories of change.

2.7 Among German art historians, such figures as Guido
Kaschnitz von Weinberg and Friederich Matz are representative of a
"structural" school. In some features the outlook of these scholars
is similar to that developed here.

For Kaschnitz "structure" is the principle of the inner
organization of form (Kaschnitz 1965:198): His concept of structure as
something deeper (higher?) than the mere outward appearance
(sichtbare Existenz) is also similar (1965:85). Yet the total divorce of
structure from material and medium seems unjustified. Kaschnitz sees
Form as above and beyond the visual existence:

Ihr eigentliches Sein besteht unabhängig davon

This may be traced directly to the influence of Riegl's concept of
"überindividuellen Kunstwollen" as the source of style and structure.
Though interesting in the treatment of act of will, the removal of the
individual and the emphasis on Will rather than on action clearly
distinguish this approach from the sort of structural study of art in
which we are interested here. Furthermore, the general structural
principles treated seem to be very nearly as general as Wölfflin's "ways
of beholding" and so do not approach the level of specificity which is
stimulated here.

Matz's concept of structure is very much the same as
that of Kaschnitz (1950:13), and the same comments apply. Matz
discusses the origins and relationships of this structural approach in the introduction to his *Geschichte der Griechischen Kunst* (1950:1-36). This kind of structural research has been applied primarily to classical materials.

As already suggested, Matz distinguishes the difference between concern with surface characteristics and the underlying unity of the relationships involved (1950:14). In addition, he also discusses the need for what we in anthropology would call diachronic and synchronic approaches to art.

On the other hand, Matz, like Kaschnitz, is interested in rather more general aspects of structure than concern us here. He deals with those structural aspects which serve to unite the arts of a period, by no means an unimportant task. Such an approach is, however, a step beyond the attempt to achieve descriptive adequacy for a single style in essentially a single medium.

2.8 Another representative of the fields of aesthetics and art history that will be discussed here is Arnold Hauser, perhaps best known for his *Social History of Art*. Here I shall deal, in somewhat cursory fashion, with the more theoretically inclined *The Philosophy of Art History*, however. Hauser's concern with sociological interpretation of art, or more accurately perhaps, the sociological background of art, is different in many respects from the treatment of art as a particular cultural subsystem. Hauser, for example, considers the purely formal rules of art as of little significance and is instead interested in the functions of art (1959:5). Like certain anthropological treatments of cultural phenomena, Hauser considers art as communication with only the "message" of significance (1959:5). But on the contrary, the view
taken here is that art is often not communicative so much as it is expressive - quite another matter. As Boas pointed out in a paper originally published in 1903, a style of art and a style of interpretation are not synonymous (1940:558). Hauser does not ignore this fact altogether (1959:270-1), but the implication that what is not significant for Hauser's purpose is insignificant must be denied. On the other hand, Hauser is clearly correct in maintaining that "It will never be possible to explain by purely formal, stylistic considerations why a line of artistic development breaks off at a certain point and gives place to a completely different one instead of going on to further progress and expansion". (1959:14).

Hauser is very clear on the point that sociology is but one of a variety of means toward understanding of art (1959:14, 40 and elsewhere) and takes an analogous position with reference to psychology (1959:107). What has been emphasized here is that the cultural systemics of art are of basic importance to the adequate use of the sociological and psychological treatments of art to which treatments it forms a necessary first step.

After discussing the relative position of the various psychological treatments of art, Hauser devotes a very large part of the Philosophy to a discussion of Wölfflin's concepts. Although there are a few lapses in this treatment (for example, Hauser seems to imply that Wölfflin supported a "uniform, periodic sequence of typical styles" while Wölfflin explicitly denies the uniform character of change on page 230 of the Principles), it is a cogent, modern assessment of Wölfflin and others sharing a similar approach. In one sense, it is again the same
argument in a different dialect as that in anthropology over the "super-organismic" (for example, 1959:197-203).

An important part of Hauser's contribution is his discussion of "style". While we may question whether "the criteria of stylistic quality and the criteria of what is relevant for art history are the same" (1959:208), this does not vitiate Hauser's view of style and art history as co-ordinate. Hauser also very clearly distinguishes the difference between the typological and systemic, though not in these terms. He also is the first to explicitly point out the reason for the failure of typological treatments of style, that is, that, for example, "The Renaissance style is at once more and less than what has actually been expressed in the works of the Renaissance Masters" (1959:210). To rephrase this in the terms of this thesis, the "generative system", while in one sense "less" than the body of the works, allows an almost infinite number of new creations within the system. As Hauser says, style must be thought of as "in abstraction from the individual artist and the individual work, but not yet as a higher, Platonic, or Hegelian idea, exemplar, model, standard of value, or norm" (1959:208). Though, as we have seen, this is to some degree foreshadowed by Croce, this is perhaps the clearest exposition in the study of art of a concept that is basic to the thesis developed here.

Hauser's sociological interests lead him to reject the "exhaustion" theory of style change which holds that changes occur when the problems of the old style are solved to the satisfaction of the artists and users of the art and thereby loses interest, though he does not deny its status as a secondary phenomenon which is socially conditioned (1959:}
228-9). Hauser emphasizes the social aspects of art in this case, as in others, and sees multiple factors involved.

Another contribution of the Philosophy from the anthropologist's view, is Hauser's discussion of folk and popular art. After all, the vast majority of the art dealt with by anthropologists belongs to these genres and the closely allied genre of "peasant art". Here the problem arises of the relationship of these to the "Arts". This is by no means a simple problem from historical and sociological views, but such differences as do exist seem more closely related to social factors than to any differences in the application of the style concept. As Hauser has said, "style" is an abstraction, but particular styles are not (1959:212).

2.9 That studies of art have tremendous variety is demonstrated by those discussed above, but only the surface has been touched. In particular, there are numerous scholars in art history and aesthetics who have "discovered" anthropology, or at least its subject matter. Thomas Munro, discussed above, is one of these. Others include figures as well known to anthropologists as George Kubler (e.g. 1962,) whose work demonstrates the fertile crossing of anthropology and art history. Kubler, particularly, shares the archaeologist's interest in sequence and change in time. Others, like Paul Wingert (e.g. 1949, 1962) stand on the hazy border between aesthetics and cultural anthropology and work in the ethnographic present.

Mention, too, must be made of Suzanne Langer's Philosophy in a New Key (1942, reprinted in 1964) which played an important part in the early stages of this work although as it now stands,
there are major differences in the area of interest. It is particularly
important to note that Langer's "generative ideas" and "symbolic
transformation" refer to somewhat different matters than do these terms
here. The differences will in part become obvious in examining the
last five chapters of Langer's book. Langer discusses in the earlier
chapters the reasons for failure of natural science approaches in
humanistic studies, and she proposes that "in the fundamental notion of
symbolism - mystical, practical, or mathematical, it makes no
difference - we have the keynote of all humanistic problems"(1964:32).
In large part, current developments in anthropology, at least, seem to
bear out Langer's quasi-predictions. It is, in fact, this sort of concept
that underlies the work of ethnoscience, Lévi-Strauss, transformational
and modern generative linguistics, and, it is hoped, the current study.
Another important point raised by Langer is her distinction of
discursive and presentational (1964:Chapter 4). Discussion of this
particular problem will be deferred until the chapter on theory, however.

Finally, a recent study by Bill Holm, a Seattle art
teacher, of the art of the region from Bella Coola to Yakutat Bay (1965)
should be discussed. Holm has carefully analyzed both the elements and
the structural principles involved. Basically, the methodology employed
is similar to that employed by Emmons, Haeberlin, and Boas also with
reference to the art of the Northwest Coast. Nonetheless, Holm is the
first to clearly organize a style description (though he rarely uses the
term "style") along "creative" (semi-generative) lines rather than merely
contenting himself with description of techniques. In terminology
analogous to Chomsky's (1964:28-9), this study approaches much closer
to the level of descriptive adequacy than do previous studies.

Holm's work is of particular interest here for several reasons. First of all, there are those broad similarities caused by the fact that the art of the Northwest Coast and the styles analysed below are both "conventionalized" art, in the broad use of the term. Furthermore, certain principles of segmentation and the like in those styles are of such a character as to be subject to the same methods of analysis. Finally, certain judgments made independently here, before I was aware of Holm's work, agree substantially with the approach he has taken. In part, this may be due to a common historical background in what I have called, below, an "American school" of art studies in anthropology. But I also like to believe that these similarities - for example, the treatment of technique and organization plus form as related - are functions of the types of styles involved.

2.10 The "history" of the treatments of style from the point of view of art criticism, art history, and aesthetics has, perforce, been dealt with here in only the briefest of summary fashion. Bernard Berenson was discussed primarily as a kind of counter-balance to the other theories. Certain aspects of Croce's aesthetic have been dealt with because of the germ of a "generative" idea which in some respects shares a common heritage with generative linguistics. We have briefly seen certain similarities of Wölfflin's and Munro's treatment of style to that of varying kinds of "typological" approaches in other fields. Matz and Kaschnitz von Weinberg represent a new kind of emphasis on "structure" which has its later parallels in anthropology. Hauser, in turn, presents the important idea of style as a system.
In addition, the questions of historical change and its processes as treated in Munro, Kubler and Hauser have direct relevance to these same questions in anthropology. Stemming, as this discussion in art history and aesthetics does, from data which are often more closely "controlled" than that of anthropology, anthropology can ill afford to ignore its essential kinship to these fields.

The next chapter is an equally eclectic discussion of some of the treatments of style by anthropologists as judged both from some of the standards of art history and the theory hinted at in the introduction.