1. Introduction

1.1 The important fact is that a given style is a "system". At this point a distinction may be drawn between "systems" and "types". A "type" may be considered to be a group of objects classed together by virtue of certain criterial characteristics and perhaps by reference to a "norm" (Shepard 1963:301). A "system", however, is neither defined by boundaries or by "ideals" or norms. Rather a system, as I have used the term here, is a set of "rules", for lack of a better word, which can be used to create objects, behavior, or patterns as the case may be. Systems, such as style, are thus distinguished on the basis of the underlying relationships among the parts rather than upon presence or absence of specific traits.

In this sense, human culture is a system which is followed in behavior, that is, culture "generates" behavior. This system has no existence independent of individuals and because of accidents of environment and learning, in the broadest sense, is slightly different from individual to individual. The borders of "a" culture can really only be defined in terms of acceptability and mutual understanding.

Culture is used by individuals at the same time that it aids in setting channels and goals for them (e.g. Leach: Political Systems of Highland Burma). But, since every individual has a slightly different picture of his "culture" than his neighbor, the relative progress of an individual in gaining success, authority, and power affects the development of his "culture" as a whole. This is the significance of Lowie's remark that individuals bear culture. Accordingly, there is a wide range of acceptability in any culture. Also, the range of acceptability is different within the society according to the place of a particular individual in the
society. Much of the same situation is true of the arts where the effect of individual on arts should not be minimized.

In addition, more than one aspect of the cultural system may find expression in a particular case. A poem, for example, is created by interlocking rules both in the sense of grammar and artistic style. In the plastic arts, too, there are aspects which cannot be efficiently dealt with under the concept of style. A clear example of this is found in the use of religious emblems or symbols. The art styles and the social uses of, say, the crosses of Christianity are quite different aspects.

It is actually rather difficult to draw the line between "style" and "culture". It is not enough to say that a style is that part of a cultural system which deals with the modification of matter, since in a larger sense all of man's actions are modifications and alterations of the physical world. If these alterations affect his own body and physical position, we call it behavior. If this behavior in turn modifies more substantial media, we call it building, manufacture, or the creation of art, to name some possibilities. All of these secondary modifications produce artifacts of one sort or another whether these be utterances, tools, or art objects.

The term "culture" as originally defined included both process and product, but process is, in fact, the core of the concept of "culture". Thus, one of the real problems of anthropology is the relationship of each of the subsystems (generating particular aspects of behavior) to each other. How related are the concepts of language and art in a particular culture, for example? Will it prove possible to combine these into more inclusive media-free generative statements - i.e.
generative "grammars" for a culture as a whole? I would think it
ultimately possible, but to state categorically that this is true would be
definitely premature. We have no basis at all for judging the "carrying
capacity" of the human mind for separate systemic "grammars". Yet,
it is true that each of the subsystems as currently dealt with, and as
dealt with herein, generally applies to the handling of themes (content)
not the determination of proper content. The following table suggests
some cultural subsystems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CULTURE (the total generative form)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grammar (langue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEECH (parole)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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At least several possibilities exist for the source
of content and themes in culture. One view has been that tradition and
individual innovation are the determinants of the content of a culture.
An extreme version of the view that tradition is the main factor may be
found in the Kulturkreislehre of Austria which stressed diffusion of
complexes. The view of functionalists and structuralists in anthropology
such as Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown has emphasized the social
aspects of content stressing the compatibility of subsystems as a major
determinant. These theories are perhaps more complimentary than they
are alternates, but the latter is entirely consistent with a suggestion
that much of content is also "generated" by its own particular subsystem.
This is, however, a question far beyond the immediate scope of this
work.

1.2 There are real problems in attempting to define the
attitudes of philosophers and art historians toward "art" since the
viewpoints differ so widely and profoundly. Frankly, I despair of
saying what art is. I do reject, however, any concept of art which limits
the term to objects done only for the sake of art. Ars gratia artis
cannot suffice as a definition since far too much of that which we must
call art through historical precedence could never meet this criterion.
The utility or use of an object must be kept separate from its status as
art. Thus the distinction between "artifact" or "tool" and objet d'art is
difficult to make. Perhaps we must accept Tylor's (1881) "Arts of Life'
and "Arts of Pleasure". Of course, in the traditional sense, the
distinction between "art" and "craft" has depended on judgment of value
and quality.

We encounter very similar problems with the
concept of "style". The term has been used in many different ways.
These range from broad, almost all-inclusive usages to narrow
applications to the work of single artists. Often the term may be used
in all these senses even by a single author. Some of the broadest
usages have occurred in anthropology. Kroeber's use of "style" in
some parts of Configurations of Culture Growth and in Style and
Civilization in his concept of "total-culture style" (e.g. 1957:70-71) is of
this broad type. However, "style" used in such a broad sense very nearly loses all meaning - or at least all capability of definition. Such usage usually results only in the confusion of the mere presence of certain motifs with the totality of the style, thus ignoring important questions of form and structure.

What of other usages more limited in scope?

Alois Riegl and others have maintained the "absolute uniqueness and incomparability of artistic achievement" (Hauser 1959:120). If this be so, then there is little reason to hope for scientific, or indeed even humanistic, evaluation of man and his works. Little can be said in refutation of this kind of extreme position except to point to the entire achievement of both the sciences and humanistic studies. Any position maintaining that art is unique in each of its manifestations is ignoring a greater truth for too strict attention to a lesser one.

What kind of style is most useful, then? As an example, an art historian might speak of an "Impressionist style" in European painting. "Style" in this sense refers to the art of a group of individuals in a society or societies. Such a style will have formal and structural characteristics which serve to identify it and is probably the most important way to consider style.

Recent developments in anthropology support the use of "style" in this more limited sense but with certain differences in emphasis discussed below. The experience of classical archaeologists and art historians also supports the restriction of the concept of style to moderate limits. Art historians have, on the whole, insisted that no study of style is complete unless distinct aspects of the art are dealt with - first, the design elements must be carefully
analyzed; second, the relationship of these elements to one another must be defined, and finally, according to some, the subjective "expression" must be taken into account (see, for example, Schapiro 1953). Just how one is to deal with "expression" is uncertain, but few anthropological studies of art seem to have gone far beyond the analysis of design elements (among the exceptions are Bunzel 1929, Haeberlin, et al. 1928, and Roark 1965).

Another factor in the success of the art historian and classical archaeologist in dealing with art has been the existence in many cases of some kind of "native" discussion and description of the style. This provides a kind of substitute for informants in Anthropology. One of the best known examples of this is to be seen in the fragments of Greek architectural statements summarized in Vitruvius (English translation, 1914). The importance of these kinds of statements has probably been underestimated in the history of art history. The influence of classical views on our treatments of art, literature, and language are scarcely arguable. In a sense, the Greeks were the first critics and "scientific" aestheticians - that is, they were the source for the idea of cultural self-examination in that they attempted to define philosophically their own culture and arts.

1.3 In looking for developments in anthropology which have direct or indirect significance for the study of art, it is striking to see the similarity of the approach used by the linguist to that of the art historian. Whether this similarity is due to the nature of cultural "facts" or the nature of our way of analyzing culture is not altogether clear, unfortunately. In any case, both the linguist and the art historian have come to be concerned with two aspects of the material
with which they deal - a formal level, which in linguistics may be called
the morpho-phonemic and phonetic, and a structural aspect, the concern
of "grammar" in part, but more simply referred to as the "structural"
level of analysis.

There may even be a linguistic analogue for the
"expression" of the art historian in the concept of "transformation"
discussed by Chomsky in his monograph *Syntactic Structures* (1963). To
establish this analogy, however, would require a substantial re-evaluation
of the nature of "expression" and of just what it is that the art historian
is really dealing with under this term.

Regardless of this, the real concern of the approach
in linguistics has come to be the writing of "generative" grammars of
languages - that is, a grammar which can be used to create original,
correct sentences and no incorrect ones. A generative grammar is
substantially different from the sort of "grammars" which occur in high
school English textbooks, of course. The purpose of these latter is
really only to act as a guide to the writing of a technical dialect which
might be called "literate English". It is also substantially different
than some of the taxonomic interests of Bloomfieldian linguistics (Chomsky
1964:24 and elsewhere).

The concept of "transformation" is perhaps one of the
better known parts of Chomsky's work and represents a powerful methodo-
logical tool for generalization about certain problems of syntax in linguistics.
One of the greatest contributions of the idea of "transformation", an example
of which would be the formation of the passive voice in English, is that
it allows relatively much simpler grammars than would be otherwise
possible. Furthermore, there may be even some evidence from psychological testing that this picture of language has some correspondence to the actual process of speech and language (Miller 1962), though those associated with transformational linguistics have studiously avoided any direct claims of this.

The whole idea of generative statements is important because it means attempting to describe cultural systems in terms of the rules which can be used to "create" the system, rather than the terms of a catalogue of a group of objects or in terms of "typical" specimen or behavior (an "ideal"). In fact, the value of treating culture as a system rather than in terms of traits is perhaps nowhere clearer than in linguistics.

Both generative statements and transformational treatment have much to contribute to the study of art. Certainly the concept of transformation can be useful in generalizing about many aspects of a particular style. More immediately important to the study of art is the idea of treating these systems in generative rather than observational manner.

It is true that in art particularly the listing of traits such as design elements may contribute greatly to studies of change in time and distribution. Yet, it does not suffice as stylistic analysis since it ignores the major criteria of style studies in art and linguistic studies in failing to treat the various levels or to make generalizations about the relationships of parts.

1.4 If styles are not treated as systems but as an agglomeration of traits and treatments, serious problems can result.
Even if there were no other reason for the study of the systemic aspects of style, the benefit of additional insight gained about the ways in which variation occurs would make such studies valuable. Such information is additional grist for the mill, and archaeologists especially cannot afford to ignore this. For example, knowledge of the kind of rules which appear to underlie a particular style can be of real assistance in distinguishing normal variation in the style from changes in time. Thus, it is certainly very helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to undertake a study of the style before the establishment of "style phases". To do otherwise is to run the danger of stacking the cards before the game is known.

This viewpoint is not shared by all workers in stylistic studies. Rowe (1959) proposes the opposite ordering with "style phases" preceding the "synchronic" analysis of styles. Rowe's "style" phases are established on the basis of "significant features", that is, those features which are significant for purposes of archaeological dating. Obviously, such an approach is practical only where an accurate and detailed sequence has already been established which can be used to determine the "significance" of a given feature. Of note, however, is the fact that others of the same "school" with the problems of style phases have concurred in some respects with the position taken here (Patterson MS.). Wingert has also agreed on the essential priority of "synchronic" studies (1949:5).

Clearly a "style" and "style" phases which are dealt with primarily in terms of temporally significant features are something different from the sort of "style" defined here. Features which may
have little temporal significance may be very significant indeed in structural terms. Of course, the difference between the two outlooks is not so great as it seems since the analysis of the style as a system will necessarily lead to hypotheses about style phases with subsequent feedback into the systemic analysis. I shall return to this question later, but for the time being, it is necessary to recognize that Rowe’s "style phases" and "styles" (as discussed in section 3.5) are in many respects broader than their namesakes here.

1.5 Given all of this, how is "style" to be defined? To return to the idea of generative statements, a style is a system of opinion, either explicitly formulated or not, of what is right and wrong in the representation of themes. In some cultures, the style may actually be formulated as a set of rules for the artist to follow. There is, of course, no guarantee that such a set of rules are "correct" - that is, that they are followed when the artist is actually at work. In many cultures, these rules may not be set up explicitly at all. Yet, it is clear that the artist does know whether he is doing the work correctly. One of the best examples of this is to be found in the discussion of Pueblo pottery manufacture by Ruth Bunzel (1929).

The best description of the way that the artist works is by saying simply that the rules are often unformulated rather than "unconscious", (see, for example, Berreman 1966:347). The artist when confronted with a finished product may be surprised to discover that certain designs are invariably associated. Nonetheless, if the matter were approached differently (perhaps in the order of construction?), there is very likely no point at which the artist could not tell that a certain
design is "best looking" or the right one and that another design looks "funny" or is simply wrong. In one sense, and one sense only, is the artist "unconscious"; he is unconscious of the system as conceived of by the anthropologist - that is, the system in terms of the final configuration - and it is simply not necessary to know this in order to construct a work of art or a correct sentence in a language.

1.6 Fine, but how is the poor archaeologist to deal with art in terms of opinion? In archaeologist's terms, a style can be considered to be represented by any group of objects for which a generative statement of some degree of descriptive adequacy can be constructed. One characteristic of this statement will have to be relative simplicity, what the mathematician calls elegance. Although this may seem to be extremely difficult (which it is), it is no more difficult (and no simpler) than for an art historian to deal with any past style or for a linguist to write a grammar for an extinct language known only through texts. Certainly, it does not seem that a "generative statement" at our present level of sophistication, at least, can "generate" all of the production of a given group of artisans. For example, the artist may misjudge the technical problems which he faces or may introduce idiosyncrasies into his work. For this reason the generative statement deals primarily with what is acceptable, rather than with what is superably or miserably done. In like manner, a grammar of Elizabethan English would not allow any person knowing it to be another Shakespeare. We are dealing primarily with style, not with how well the style is fulfilled or surpassed. Having thus saved the art critic from job obsolescence, it can also be pointed out that it is
precisely these differences of opinion of "correctness" referred to above which are invaluable to the archaeologist in detecting very fine temporal and cultural variations. In this respect, these differences can be somewhat like "dialects" in language.

We have looked at what at first glance appears to be an analogy from linguistics to the study of art. This impression is largely erroneous. The similarity results mostly from the fact that both art and language are facets of human culture and share many common characteristics. It is natural and good that there should be cross-fertilization between such studies, but it should never be assumed that the answer to the problems of the study of art in anthropology lies in a simple transference of method and technique from linguistics or from any other field. Many of the concepts inspired by linguistics herein have been greatly or subtly modified.

1.7

Many other recent studies in cultural and social anthropology have also drawn inspiration from linguistics, and it may be instructional to briefly examine some of these. One of the major characteristics of these studies is the treatment of culture as communication (e.g. Hall 1959). Yet, as expressed here, this is less significant than the observation that communication is human activity, action, call it what you will, and here lies the major similarity to the rest of culture. In short, we are concerned with the how rather than the why. I have suggested in this paper the possibility that the semantic content of culture might also be treated by generative means; but, regardless of this, the aim of structural analysis in art, or culture, is not directly meaning but manner. Of course, it may be claimed
that I am making necessity into virtue, since I am dealing with archaeological materials where questions of meaning are at best speculative. Nonetheless, it is interesting that linguists in facing similar problems where meaning was accessible have avoided basing their analysis on totally semantic lines (e.g. Hymes 1964:30).

Another aspect of cultural studies based in linguistic analogy is that they are greatly concerned with the definition of units of some sort which are like the phonemes, morphemes, and so on of modern linguistics (e.g. Hall 1959:98). The so-called "emic" and "etic" levels of analysis based in the "phonemic" and "phonetic" levels of linguistics are of this nature. The background for such units is partly in the cultural anthropologist's great uneasiness over the lack of agreement between studies of the same culture. The feeling is very strong that "if only" there were units like phonemes, then could consistency and "replication" be achieved. Yet, techniques like those of "ethnoscience" while achieving great exactness (and perhaps capability of replication) have largely been concerned with trivial matters (e.g. what is a "tree" vis a vis a "bush"). In fact, there has been little problem with "replication" in anthropology with regard to matters on the "emic" and "etic" levels. The real problems (except perhaps for certain cases with regard to kinship) have been problems of disagreement about structure. The disturbing thing about componential analysis and its siblings is not so much the problems of validity but that so few of those engaged along these lines indicate that they feel anything else is necessary. Notable exceptions do exist, however (e.g. Kernan 1965).

Finally, there is the regrettable tendency to
identify the "emic" with the sort of unit that Chomsky terms "taxonomic phonemes" (Chomsky 1964:75ff). Chomsky's arguments that this sort of unit is unnecessary are decisive and need not be repeated here. I can see no more theoretical basis for this level in cultural analysis than in linguistics. This is especially true insofar as the techniques employed in "emic" analysis parallel those of taxonomic linguistics closely in using criteria of linearity, invariance, biuniqueness, and local determinacy.